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Interpretation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) according to 
Principles of International Law – a reply. 
 





The successful acceptance and application of international uniform law instruments such 
as the CISG depends on outcomes, which are consistent and predictable in all member 
states. The most important single factor to achieve uniformity and hence predictability is 
a uniform interpretation of laws. The CISG has recognized this and introduced article 7 
into its regime. Much has been written, which intends to explain the importance and 
function of article 7.1  
 
An argument has been advanced that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) is also applicable in the interpretation of the CISG. Specifically Roth suggests 
that articles 31 to 33 of the VCLT ought to be taken into consideration when interpreting 
the CISG.2 In support of their argument both Roth and Happ3 contend that the rules of 
the VCLT represent and coincide with valid customary international law.4 They argue 
that: 
 
d according to rules of international law as 
set forth in Art 31-33 of the VCTL.”5 
elop a methodology or methodological reasoning.6 In summary the contention is 
at: 
 
se in mind, and resorting to 
the preparatory work of the treaty when necessary.”7 
 
                                                
“There is no convincing argument against interpreting all the provisions of the 
CISG according to international law rules. Since the CISG is a treaty governed by 
international law, it must be interprete
 
In addition the above authors suggest that very few attempts have been made to explain 
or dev
th
“… supporters of autonomous interpretation actually derive the meaning of terms 
from the wording in context, keeping object and purpo
 
* lecturer, School of Law, Victoria University, Melbourne 
1 See Pace website http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg 
2 Roth, M and Happ. R., “Interpretation of the CISG According to Principles of International Law” 
International Trade and Business Law Annual, Vol, IV 1999 1, 5. 
3 Happ R., “Anwendbarkeit völkerrechlicher Auslegungsmethoden auf das UN-Kaufrecht” (1997) 5 Recht 
der Internationalen Wirtschaft. 
4 Roth above n 2, 5. 
5 Ibid 11. 
6 ibid 3. 
7 Ibid. 
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Such an argument is given weight if article 31 of the VCLT is considered. This article 
states:  
 “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.” 
 
The proposition presented by the above authors needs to be viewed critically. There is no 
debate that the VCLT has a relationship with the CISG. The question is how far and to 
what extent does the VCLT influence the interpretation of the CISG?   
 
 
VCLT article 31 – an analysis  
 
A brief analysis of article 31 is appropriate to fully understand its influence and value. 
The first point to note is that the VCLT as a customary rule is primarily used for the 
interpretation of treaties where the State is a party to the proceedings. This in itself does 
not indicate that the VCLT is not appropriately used for private international law as well. 
It merely suggests that its usage is specifically important for the interpretation of public 
international law. The VCTL is appropriately used where treaties, unlike the CISG, have 
not incorporated an interpretative article into their regime. 
 
Roth confirms such an argument by stating that:  
 
“… multilateral treaties [such as] the Convention on the Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods by Road is unanimously interpreted by applying 
the rules set forth in Arts 31-33 of the VCLT as no other specific rules of 
interpretation exists.”8 
 
As all treaties must be ratified it is left to municipal courts to apply the rules of 
interpretation of international documents and views were expressed that: 
 
“there is a high probability that [words and expressions] have been incorporated 
with knowledge of the meaning which has been given to them by national 
courts.”9 
 
However such arguments have been dismissed. It is now universally recognized that in 
the interest of uniformity national courts must construe conventions “on broad principles 
of general acceptation.”10  
 
Such broad principles could be termed valid customary international law if a uniform 
understanding as to the custom could be established. Roth suggests that: 
 
                                                 
8 ibid 8. 
9 Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Gamlen Chemical Co A/Asia Pty Ltd. [H.C.A.] 1980, 159. 
10 James Buchanan & Co. Ltd v Babco Forwarding & Shipping (UK) Ltd [1978] A.C. 141, 152. 
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“Evidence of customary international law requires evidence of constant state 
practice and the conviction of states in action that they are legally bound to their 
actions.”11  
 
However for a custom to be termed international, evidence of usage must also be 
international. A constant practice within one state would elevate that particular event into 
a customary law in that particular state. It could not be termed an international customary 
law because it is only applied locally. An international customary law does not only 
require intra state compliance but also interstate recognition.   
 
Furthermore most commonly article 31 has been interpreted as indicating that “an 
ordinary meaning has to be given to the terms of a treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose.”12 The problem, which may arise is whether a court in its 
application of “ordinary meaning” can turn to a cultural meaning, which is by definition 
external to the particular treaty in question. In other words is the  “object and context” of 
a treaty a tool which allows the inclusion of cultural meanings? Article 31(3) despite the 
fact that it widens the scope of what is allowable only “takes into account ... subsequent 
agreements between the parties”13 which hardly expresses cultural meanings. The VCTL 
due to its very nature of applying to treaties of different subject matters must in nature be 
a “generic” product.  
 
In other words, the VCLT is an instrument attempting to serve all conventions and 
treaties and hence “context” is the restring factor of interpretation. The fact that object 
and purpose of a treaty must be viewed in context suggests that the VCTL in its 
interpretation is bound to the four corners of a treaty. Arguably Katz J must have had in 
mind that the VCTL merely incorporated an international rule into its regime, which 
already existed in international public law. Otherwise it would be unclear why he gave 
supremacy to the customary rule when he noted:  
 
“the Vienna Convention constitutes an authoritative statement of customary 
international law including the customary public international law of the 
interpretation of treaties and it was those rules of customary public international 
law rather than the Vienna Convention itself which obliged Cooper J to look 
beyond the text … in order to arrive at its correct construction.”14 
 
 
Such an observation leads to the conclusion that article 31 of the VCLT is a tool to 
interpret treaties and conventions where the text is unclear. It appears therefore that 
customary public law is not to be confused with the rules laid down in the VCLT. Such 
conclusion as derived at by Katz J15 is supported by the fact that the VCLT is not a 
governing law in all countries of the world but merely in those who adopted and ratified 
                                                 
11 Roth above n 2, fn 22. 
12 WTO Panel Report WT/DS160/R, 15 June 2000, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act 
13 article 31.3 VCTL 
14 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Savvin [2000] FCA 478 (12 April 2000), 91. 
15 Ibid. 
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this particular convention. Hence it follows that if one would talk about a customary 
public law one would assume that it is applicable everywhere and not constraint by a 
ratification process which imposes limitations. This does not mean that article 31 is not 
an authoritative statement of a customary public law. Indeed Katz J noted that: 
 
“ … no doubt because the Vienna Convention does constitute an authoritative 
statement of customary public international law rules for the interpretation of 
treaties that its relevant provisions … are referred to …”16 
 
However the mere application of authoritative statements does not guarantee a uniform 
application despite the fact that the aim of the VCLT is to harmonize and unify the 
application of international treaties. As an example it has been shown that uniformity is 
not a feature of the Hague Rules.17As a consequence McHugh J was compelled to explain 
that: 
 
“If uniformity of interpretation could be achieved by abandoning the approach 
taken by this court in Gamlen I would be in favor of overruling Gamlen. But to 
overrule that decision would not yield uniformity – the approach of courts in 
England, Germany and France would remain different.”18 
 
However it must be recognized that McHugh J did not indicate the source of his 
information and hence it is not clear whether the courts of the various countries did apply 
the VCLT. The fact remains that uniformity has not been achieved.  
 
In sum article 31 represents an authoritative statement of international interpretative rules 
and as such is an invaluable tool to interpret treaties.  But as a generic product the VCLT 
needs to be applied to a variety of treaties. It is used to interpret WTO rules, various 
conventions in private law such as the Hague Rules and International Carriage by Road 
Convention. Furthermore disputes between States19 as well as questions of interpretation 
of a Constitution as to international involvement in armed conflict20 have been assisted 
by the VCLT. Due to its general nature the VCLT must, as a rule, remain “general” in its 
application and is not suited to assist in the interpretation, which requires a distinctively 
specialized approach. 
 
The problem – a preliminary view 
 
There are really two arguments contained in the proposition of the above authors. The 
first argument is that in effect article 7 is incapable to contribute towards a methodology 
                                                 
16 ibid. 
17 Great China Metal Industries Co Limited v Malaysian International Shipping Corporati Berhad 
[1998]196 CLR 161, 187. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Bundesgericht, Urteil BGE 97 I 359, Bundesrepublik Deutschland gegen Kanton Schaffhausen, 
[http://www.eurospider.ch] last update September 20, 2001 
20 2BvE 3/92, 2BvE 5/93, 2BvE 7/93, 2BvE 8/93, [http://www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/HFR/12-
1996/Urt920286.html] 
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of interpretation. By implication the contention is made that the VCLT will just do that. 
This paper will not address this issue.21 
 
The second argument is that the VCLT is better equipped to solve the interpretational 
needs of the CISG and therefore can or should replace article 7. 
 
There are several reasons why this is not so. The most compelling reason is that the 
VCLT, like any other treaty, needs to be ratified.  Furthermore article 4 of the VCLT 
forbids retroactivity. Therefore all states, which have ratified the CISG before they 
ratified the VCLT or have not ratified the VCLT, cannot apply the Law of Treaties to the 
CISG. Roth herself mentions this impediment and notes that: 
 
“Since not all CISG member states are also parties to the VCLT, such as the USA 




Therefore the very argument that the VCLT is not always applicable is in direct breach of 
the mandate in article 7 namely the need to “promote uniformity in its application.”  Roth 
though suggests that the VCLT is still applicable as article 31 coincides with valid 
customary international law.23 However such a suggestion is tentative and lacks certainty. 
Why introduce a possible customary international law when the CISG already has in its 
regime a firm and certain rule as to interpretation? 
  
Secondly there is no authority that one article of one convention can override and replace 
an article in another convention. A distinction has to be made where a particular 
convention has no interpretative articles. In such a case the VCLT can supply an answer 
but only if the States concerned have ratified the VCLT and are therefore within the 
mandate of article 4 VCLT. In these circumstances contractual obligations emanating 
from ratification are adhered to.  
 
On the other hand where an interpretative article forms part of the convention contracting 
parties are only bound to what they have signed and not what could possible be 
introduced at a later stage. It contravenes all principles of treaty ratification as well as 
contract principles.   
 
As a third argument consideration must be given to the overwhelming agreement 
amongst scholars that the CISG must be interpreted autonomously.24 As such principles, 
which are not part of the CISG, cannot be introduced as interpretative tools.  
                                                 
21 For a full discussion on a methodology of interpretation of the CISG see: Zeller, B. “The United Nations 
Convention on contracts for the International Sale of Goods – A Methodology for its Interpretation and 
Application.”  PhD Thesis  (Law)  The University of Melbourne, (2002) 
22 Roth above n 2, 5. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See Diedrich F., “Autonome Auslegung von Internationalem Einheitsrecht, 1994, and Schlechtriem, P., 





The relationship between the CISG and the VCLT 
 
The CISG as an improvement to many conventions and treaties incorporates its own 
interpretative articles hence a mandatory application of article 7 is warranted. However 
the argument has been advanced that article 7 only “addresses the special features and 
goals of the convention’s application but does not mention the methods of 
interpretation.25 The fact that Happ argues that the CISG has “special features and goals” 
would make an application of the VCLT problematic. Happ continues to argue that the 
CISG does not formulate any methods of interpretation but that the CISG must be 
interpreted uniformly.26  
 
As mentioned above, the problem of applying the VCLT will have an important bearing 
on uniformity if a country has not ratified the VCLT but has done so for the CISG. 
Pursuant to the VCLT it cannot be applied if it is not ratified. In such an instant a judge or 
arbitrator would be compelled to either use domestic interpretative methods or rely on 
article 7. In either case uniformity worldwide could not be achieved.  
 
Roth argues that customary international law principles as embodied in article 31 VCLT 
are applicable to the CISG because they are universally valid.27 Such a statement is based 
on certain assumptions, which are difficult to maintain. First it assumes that 
internationally the rules are not only known but are also practiced. Secondly as customary 
rules are not binding - they are not based on legislation - it is difficult to argue that 
customary rules are universally valid. The fact that courts are compelled to invoke article 
7 indicates that at least all courts and tribunals use the same tool.  
 
It is a completely different argument to suggest that the interpretation set forth in the 
VCLT is applicable to the CISG. That may well be the case but the main question still 
remains will the VCLT achieve what article 7 purportedly fails to do and secondly does 
the CISG actually allow the “importation” of another interpretive tool to regulate the 
CISG. 
 
It cannot be disputed that the VCLT has a connection with the CISG. Simply put the 
CISG is a convention hence the Law of Treaties is relevant as it regulates the mechanism 
through which States can enter into binding treaties with each other. The obligations of 
the Contracting States to each other are contained in Part IV of the CISG. Interpretation 
and construction of that part must be undertaken within the confines of the VCLT. The 
other Parts deal with the obligations of parties to a sales contract and hence are governed 
by article 7. However there is an interesting question; what governs the interpretation of 
article 7?  Honnold puts the following argument:  
 
                                                 
25 Roth above n 2, 1,  
26 Happ above n 3,  376. 
27 Rothabove n 2, 7. 
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“Article 7 of the Sales Convention embodies mutual obligations of the 
Contracting States as to how their tribunals will construe the Convention. Hence 
the Vienna Convention would be pertinent to a question concerning the 
construction of article 7, but the Vienna Convention would not govern the 
interpretation of the articles dealing with the obligations of the parties to the 
sales contract, for these articles are to be construed according to the principles of 
article 7.”28 
 
Honnold identifies two distinctly different tasks. First the interpretation of article 7 and 
secondly the application of article 7 to interpret the CISG specifically the articles dealing 
with the obligations of the parties to the sales contract.   
 
Such an interpretation is indeed very logical. As the CISG has no tools or methodology in 
place to interpret the interpretative article it cannot interpret itself. Such a task should be 
left to the VCLT or more accurately to the “rules of customary public international 
rules.” However once article 7 is clear and unambiguous, it is the appropriate tool to 
exercise its function allocated by the CISG, namely to interpret the articles of the CISG. 
If Honnold is right in his assessment then Roth and Happ by definition must be wrong as 
they assume that the VCLT can be used to interpret “all the provisions of the CISG.”29  
 
It could be argued that a relationship between the CISG and the VCTL can be discovered 
because it is a fact that the interpretative rules of the VCLT are widely known and 
regularly observed by courts. As an example the WTO Appellate Court stated: 
 
“…the Panel relies also on the customary rules of interpretation of …  
international law as a basis for the interpretative principles it offers …”30 
 
The VCTL is a customary rule and therefore could be connected to the CISG through 
article 9, which states:  
 
“The Parties are considered … to have impliedly made applicable to their 
contract or its formation a usage … which in international trade is widely known 
to and regularly observed.” 
 
However it is difficult to argue that a “usage” as envisaged by the drafters of the CISG 
includes a customary rule of interpretation. Rather it refers to customs by merchant. 
Furthermore article 9 is subject to article 7 and hence must be interpreted autonomously 
as suggested by Honnold. Roth and Happ have extended the terminology of “usage” to 
the VCTL and hence linked it to the CISG despite Roth making the correct observation 
that the interpretation of the CISG and interpretation of contracts is different. The CISG 
                                                 
28 J. Honnold,  “Uniform Sales for International Sales” (1991) 159. 
29 Roth above n 2, 11. 
30 WTO Appelate Body, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products. 
WT/DS50/AB/R, 19 December 1997, 17. 
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is interpreted pursuant to article 7 whereas contracts are interpreted according to articles 
8 and 9.31  As seen above such an extension is flawed and unsustainable.   
 
 
Context and General Principles 
 
There is also a further important difference between the CISG and the VCTL, which both 
Roth and Happ have not specifically enlarged on or only mentioned in passing, which is 
contained in article 7(2).  
This article states: 
 
"(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not 
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on 
which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law 
applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law." 
 
The point is that the CISG recognizes that not all matters are settled and that gaps must 
be “settled in conformity with general principles.” The VCLT on the other hand 
stipulates, that a meaning to terms must be given “in their context”.  
 
It is argued that article 31 which uses the words “context” and “object and purpose” does 
not envisage what article 7(2) stipulates namely “general principles”. In a methodological 
sense context and general principles are not the same. A general principle is a much 
wider term and gives rise to a broader methodology than merely relying on a “context”. It 
can be argued that the VCLT has a far narrower mandate that article 7. Article 7(2) 
requires that interpretation and hence filling of gaps must be settled in conformity with 
general principles. Therefore after considering the context of the CISG and having failed 
to come to a conclusion, general principles must be used to come to a conclusion. Article 
31 on the other hand is a generic article. It can be used in any treaty or convention but 
only within the context and again only in “the light of its object and purpose” suggesting 
that the VCLT is narrower in its application than the CISG. 
 
Arguably it is possible to interpret the CISG according to the rules as set out in article 31 
to 33 of the VCLT in exactly the same fashion as pursuant to article 7(1) of the CISG. 
The difference however is that under the VCLT this is the end of the matter in relation to 
interpretation, whereas article 7(2) instructs the courts and tribunals to apply general 
principles32. 
 
The difference between article 7 of the CISG and articles 31 to 33 of the VCLT is that 
article 7 is in its socialization process turned to solve contractual problems. As such 
cultural meanings are not only included in the words contained in the CISG but also in 
the general principles. A distinction has been drawn between legal provisions and general 
principles.  
                                                 
31 Roth above n 2, 7. 
32 It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss general principles but rather to evaluate the possible 
application of articles 31 -33 to interpret the CISG 
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Drobnig illustrates the distinction by pointing to the fact that it is bound up with the 
Roman division between leges and jus. Such a distinction was also used within article 
7(2) of the CISG.33  Drobnig observed that: 
 
“it is almost of the essence of general principles of law that they are not laid 
down by any legislative action. They are nowhere readily formulated – rather 
they have to be elaborated.”34 
 
How then can general principles be elaborated? Such a question can only be answered if 
the purpose for such elaboration is known. If it is for the purpose of a doctrinal analysis 
of general principle then the solution is a comparison of national and international 
systems of contract law that is comparative law. These principles therefore need only be 
understood in a broad sense. If the purpose is to discover general principles within the 
CISG such an analysis must be rejected due to the mandate of article 7(1). However this 
does not change the understanding of principles. They still must be understood in a broad 
rather than technical sense as they contain “rules” as well as  “principles”.35   
 
A further argument against the use of the VCLT in the interpretative process is that the 
CISG, rather uniquely introduced a rhetorical community in which the readers 
 
“first assent to the language and values of the text itself, and then use the 
language and values to inform their relations with one another.”36 
 
The CISG therefore, compared with other conventions and treaties, has unique values. It 
has a common language reflecting values, which are understood irrespective of the 
cultural or legal background of those who apply the convention because the CISG defines 
the values of its own community. From that point of view alone a generic interpretative 
tool cannot be superior or replace an interpretative instrument specifically designed to 
serve a rhetorical community through the use of principles.  
 
Furthermore it should be considered that in Texaco v Libyan Arab Republic37 the 
arbitrator noted that general principles are one of the sources of international law.38 
Interestingly the arbitrator argued that there is a difference between “general principles” 
and “principles of international law”. He pointed out that: 
 
“principles of international law” are of a wider scope than “general principles” 
because “the latter contribute with other elements [such as] international custom 
                                                 
33 U. Drobnig, “General Principles of European Contract Law” in P. Sarcevic  and P. Volken,  (eds), 
International Sale of Goods, Dubrovnik Lectures ( 1985) 306. 
34 Ibid 310. 
35 M. Gebauer,  “Uniform Law, General Principles and Autonomous Interpretation” (2000) 4 Uniform Law 
Review  683, 696. 
36 A.H. Kastely,  “Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the United Nations Sales 
Convention” (1988) 8 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 574, 574. 
37 E. Lauterpacht (ed), “International Law Reports”  Vol 53, (1976). 
38 Ibid 452. 
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and practice … to constitute [a] criterion for the internationalization of a 
contract.”39  
 
The conclusion suggests that the CISG in article 7(2) refers to “principles of international 
law” whereas arguably the VCLT was written with general principles of interpretation in 
mind. Such an argument is based on the fact that the functions of the two instruments are 
different. The purpose of the VCLT is to interpret treaties whereas the CISG interprets 
international contracts.  
 
An internationalization of contracts also requires that words used within the instrument 
be of an international character. The approach to the choice of words must view words 
not in a national but international context. It also overcomes the problem Honnold 
describes as literary “deconstruction.”40  
 
Such considerations made the choice of words harder and required a special solution. The 
drafters of the CISG solved this particular problem and consciously "rooted out words 
with domestic legal connotations in favour of non-legal earthy words to refer to physical 
acts."41  In sum the CISG must and has used words that refer to typical events of 
international transactions and “in which the community can conceive relationships and 
resolve conflicts.”42  
 
Considering the aspects of language and general principles it is difficult to argue that a 
generic product such as the VCLT can be used to interpret the CISG little alone to argue 
that it is a superior instrument than article 7.  Article 7 has been written in harmony with 
the CISG as a whole and its design reflects the aspiration of the CISG to be uniformly 
applicable to international contracts. Roth argues that through the application of the 
VCTL differing methods of interpretations are avoided because: 
 
“interpreting treaties by means of customary international law promotes 
harmonious uniform application of law.”43 
 
Such an argument has shown to be wrong due to the special need of the CISG and more 
importantly McHugh J has pointed out that the Hague Rules are not interpreted uniformly 
all the time44. Furthermore an investigation of the CISG has shown that uniformity on the 
whole has been achieved despite the fact that foreign decisions are never treated as being 
binding but are considered to be of persuasive nature.45   
 
 
                                                 
39 Ibid 452 – 453. 
40 J. Honnold, "Uniform Laws for International Trade: Early "Care and Feeding" for Uniform Growth", 
(1995) 1 International Trade and Business Law Journal 1, fn 6. 
41 Ibid 2. 
42 Kastely above n 36, 579. 
43 Roth above n 2, 9. 
44 Great China Metal Industries Co Limited v Malaysian International Shipping Corporati Berhad 
[1998]196 CLR 161 




This paper argued that the VCLT has only a limited relationship with he CISG. Such a 
relationship exists as Part IV of the CISG regulates the obligations of contracting States 
with each other. An interpretation of this part must be undertaken by the VCLT, as its 
specific purpose is to interpret treaties. Furthermore article 7 must be interpreted by the 
VCLT, as the CISG has no interpretive tools specifically designed to do just that. 
However the involvement of the VCLT does not go further. The CISG through article 7 
has at its disposition a mechanism whereby ambiguities can be interpreted in a way the 
drafters of the convention - and for that matter those who ratified it – expressed their 
intention.  
 
However the important and possibly distinguishing feature between the CISG and the 
VCLT is article 7(2) specifically the rule that questions, which are not expressly settled, 
“are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based.”  
 
The most compelling argument is that the CISG and specifically article 7 and not article 
31 of the VCLT has established itself as the benchmark for the interpretation of 
international instruments. UNIDROIT has produced two important restatements first the 
Principles of International Commercial Contract Law (PICC) and secondly the 
Convention on International Factoring. UNCITRAL currently has produced a draft 
Convention on Assignment in Receivables Financing. Furthermore the Commission on 
European Contract Law has released the Principles on European Contract law (PECL).  
All of the above instruments have included either in total or at least partially article 7 of 
the CISG. 
 
  
